






Love as the Foundation of Ubuntu
Abstract
Ubuntu is widely understood as a moral theory with a scope that is wide enough to explain 
what counts as the right kind of human behaviour as well as what it means to be a per­
son. Understood in its basic form, Ubuntu is a relational theory about human interaction 
wherein its main focus could be argued to be a matter of living with raw awareness of the 
interdependence necessary among people – a kind of interdependence that enables com­
munities to remain united. Herein I want to turn the attention to the meta­ethical analysis 
of Ubuntu, wherein I explore the possibility of love as a foundation for Ubuntu. What is 
interesting about Ubuntu in this meta­ethical sense is not the kind of behaviour it inspires in 
























This	 paper	 benefitted	 from	comments	 given	
by	 Lindokuhle	 Gama,	 David	 Barnard,	 Jur-
gen	Wolfenden,	and	Nyawasedza	Tshivhase.	
It	was	also	improved	following	the	feedback	




















different	aspect	to	explain	what	it	means	to	be	a	person:	Muthu ndi muthu nga 
vhanwe vhathu2	–	and	– u vha muthu zwi vhonala nga zwiito na kutshilisane 






















to	 each	other	due	 to	 the	close	proximity	 in	 terms	of	 immediate	 communal	
location	or	corporeal	reality.3
Ubuntu	can	be	considered	a	universal	moral	ethic	whose	validity	is	not	lim-













M.	 Tshivhase,	 Love	 as	 the	 Foundation	 of	
Ubuntu199
thereof.	The	 idea	of	Ubuntu	 that	 is	derived	mainly	from	close	relations	 in-
volving	friendships,	collegiality,	family	ties,	and	so	forth,	limits	the	meaning	
of	Ubuntu	 to	 its	 instrumentality	 for	 human	 beings	 and	makes	 humans	 the	
foundation	of	Ubuntu.
In	the	first	section,	I	will	briefly	discuss	Ubuntu	with	the	aim	to	explain	the	










primarily	 in	 relation	 to	 humans.	 I	will	 argue	 that	 it	 does	 not	make	 logical	
sense	for	persons	to	be	both	the	foundation	and	beneficiaries	of	Ubuntu.
A Brief Overview of Ubuntu
There	are	different	approaches	to	Ubuntu.	While	most	of	them	agree	on	the	
basic	 traits	 of	Ubuntu,	 they	 do	 not	 always	 emphasize	 the	 same	 aspects.	A	
thinker	such	as	Augustine	Schutte	(2001:	7–11)	frames	Ubuntu	in	the	context	
of	the	epistemological	productions	from	Africa	in	relation	to	those	from	the	















of	 the	 shaping	of	 one’s	 character	 on	 communal	 relationships	 (Metz,	 2007:	
323;	Murove,	 2014:	 42,	 44).	The	 relationality	 constitutes	 a	 requirement	 to	





The	 famous	 Nguni	 version	 of	 this	 adage	 is	




hood)	 since	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 a	 person,	
vis­á­vis a	morally	 excellent	 individual	who	
espouses	 Ubuntu,	 extends	 into	 the	 stage	 of	
ancestorhood.	 (Menkiti,	 1979).	 Moreover,	
Mangena	 (2012)	 asserts	 that	 the	 dialogical	
structure	 of	 Ubuntu	 enables	 communication	






























theory.	While	 it	 is	 fundamental	 to	consider	Ubuntu	for	 its	moral	 impetus,	 I	
think	 it	 is	 equally	 important	 to	consider	what	 constitutes	 the	 foundation	of	




















tu	–	 that	much	one	 cannot	deny.	However,	 none	of	 them	considers	Ubuntu	













so	 that	 being	 a	 human	 being	 is	 recognized	 through	 illustrating	 humanness	














hardly	 disagree	 about	 personhood	 being	 a	matter	 of	moral	 goodness.	 The	









The	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	 structures	 of	 Ubuntu,	 as	 determined	
by	Ramose,	 do	 not	 escape	 this	 problem.	Ramose	 (2002)	 considers	Ubuntu	
in	terms	of	what	he	considers	the	ontological	and	epistemological	elements,	
while	Ntibagirirwa	 (2018)	 considers	Ubuntu	 through	what	 she	 considers	 a	






categories,	which	he	states	he	adopts	from	Alexis	Kagame,	are kintu, hantu, 








acterizes	 the	 prefix	 as	 ‘bu’	 as	 opposed	 to	
‘ubu’,	 as	Ramose	 states	 it.	My	 view	 is	 that	
this	is	a	mistake	as	it	misrepresents	Ramose’s	


















a	place	and	 time,	a	modality	or	a	human	being.	 ‘-ntu’	 is	 the	epistemologi-
cal	aspect	of	Ubuntu,	while	‘ubu-’	is	the	ontological	aspect	(Ramose,	2002:	
324–325).	In	this	respect,	it	is	important	for	Ramose	to	make	this	distinction	
between	 the	ontological	 and	 the	epistemological,	but	only	on	a	conceptual	
level.	In	the	every	day,	ubu-ntu	becomes	meaningful	only	when	it	is	discussed	












phy,	 namely	 kintu,	muntu,	hantu,	 kuntu	 (2018:	 116–117).	 Contra	Ramose,	
Ntibagirirwa	argues	that	‘-ntu’	 is	 the	general/universal	force,	 instead	of	 the	
‘ubu-’.	Furthermore,	being	should	be	understood	a posteriori	so	that	what	it	
means	to	exist	necessarily	involve	interaction	with	other	beings	in	the	world.	
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that	 love	 is	a	 response	 to	 the	 incomparable	value	of	an	 individual	wherein	









































































I	contend	 that	 such	a	view	of	closes	 love	off	 to	derive	meaning	only	 from	
humanity	so	that	other	living	beings	only	come	to	matter	or	experience	love	
when	humans	interact	with	or	recognize	them.	Considered	in	this	way	then,	











of	Ubuntu.	The	 idea	 of	 punishment	 as	 love	 opens	 avenues	 that	 enable	 the	




illustration	of	 an	 aspect	 about	 the	 community	 that	depends,	 in	most	 cases,	
on	culture.	Cultural	relativity	complicates	the	story	of	Ubuntu	as	displays	of	
































is	 to	 truly	 permeate	 through	 all	 the	 four	 categories	 of	African	 philosophy,	
without	presenting	humans	as	hierarchically	above	the	other	categories,	then	
we	may	want	 to	consider	 the	view	 that	Ubuntu	 is	not	grounded	 in	how	 to	
perceive	and	appropriate	it.	When	we	maintain	a	view	of	Ubuntu	that	is	hu-
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Mpho Tshivhase
Ljubav kao osnova Ubuntua
Sažetak
Ubuntu je široko razumljen kao teorija morala sa širinom dovoljnom da objasni što se smatra 
ispravnim ljudskim ponašanjem, kao i to što znači biti osoba. Razumljen u osnovnom obliku, 
Ubuntu je relacijska teorija o ljudskoj interakciji, a moglo bi se reći da je glavni fokus na način 
življenja s golom svijesti o potrebitoj međuovisnosti među ljudima – vrsti međuovisnosti koja 
omogućuje da zajednica ostaje cjelovita. Ovdje se želim osvrnuti na meta­etičku analizu Ubun­
tu filozofije, pri čemu ispitujem mogućnost ljubavi kao njene osnove. Ono što je zanimljivost 
Ubuntu filozofije u ovom meta­etičkom smislu nije to kakvo ponašanje pobuđuje u ljudima, nego 
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Mpho Tshivhase
Liebe als Grundlage des Ubuntu
Zusammenfassung
Ubuntu wird weithin als Moraltheorie verstanden, deren Breite ausreicht, um zu erklären, was 
als korrektes menschliches Verhalten angesehen wird und was es zudem bedeutet, eine Person 
zu sein. In der Grundform begriffen ist Ubuntu die relationale Theorie der menschlichen Inter­
aktion, und es kann gesagt werden, dass der Schwerpunkt auf der Lebensweise liegt, wobei man 
nacktes Bewusstsein für die unumgängliche Interdependenz zwischen den Menschen entwickelt 
– eine Art Interdependenz, die es der Gemeinschaft erlaubt, ganzheitlich zu bleiben. Ich möchte 
hier die metaethische Analyse der Ubuntu­Philosophie in Erwägung ziehen, wobei ich die Mög­
lichkeit der Liebe als ihrer Grundlage prüfe. Was aber interessant an der Ubuntu­Philosophie in 
diesem metaethischen Sinne ist, ist nicht die Art des Verhaltens, das sie in den Menschen auslöst, 




L’amour comme fondement de l’Ubuntu
Résumé
L’Ubuntu est principalement comprise comme une théorie morale suffisamment large pour 
expliquer ce qu’est un comportement humain juste, mais également ce que signifie être une 
personne. D’un point de vue de sa forme principale, l’Ubuntu est une théorie relationnelle sur 
l’interaction humaine, mais il est possible d’affirmer qu’elle se focalise principalement sur la 
manière de vivre à l’état de pure conscience et sur le besoin d’interdépendance parmi les gens 
– genre d’interdépendance qui permet à la communauté de rester entière. Je souhaite ici me 
pencher sur l’analyse méta­éthique de la philosophie Ubuntu en interrogeant ainsi la possibilité 
que l’amour en constitue le fondement. Ce qui est intéressant dans la philosophie Ubuntu dans 
le sens méta­éthique ne concerne pas le comportement qu’elle réveille chez les gens, mais quelle 
vertu se trouve dans son principe.
Mots-clés
Ubuntu,	amour,	théorie	de	la	moralité,	interaction	humaine,	éthique	des	vertus
